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Coevolving and competing species or game-theoretic strategies exhibit rich and complex dynamics for which
a general theoretical framework based on finite populations is still lacking. Recently, an explicit mean-field
description in the form of a Fokker-Planck equation was derived for frequency-dependent selection with two
strategies in finite populations based on microscopic processes [A. Traulsen, J. C. Claussen, and C. Hauert,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 238701 (2005)]. Here we generalize this approach in a twofold way: First, we extend the
framework to an arbitrary number of strategies and second, we allow for mutations in the evolutionary process.
The deterministic limit of infinite population size of the frequency dependent Moran process yields the adjusted
replicator-mutator equation, which describes the combined effect of selection and mutation. For finite popula-
tions, we provide an extension taking random drift into account. In the limit of neutral selection, i.e. whenever
the process is determined by random drift and mutations, the stationary strategy distribution is derived. This
distribution forms the background for the coevolutionary process. In particular, a critical mutation rate uc is
obtained separating two scenarios: above uc the population predominantly consists of a mixture of strategies
whereas below uc the population tends to be in homogenous states. For one of the fundamental problems in
evolutionary biology, the evolution of cooperation under Darwinian selection, we demonstrate that the analytical
framework provides excellent approximations to individual based simulations even for rather small population
sizes. This approach complements simulation results and provides a deeper, systematic understanding of coevo-
lutionary dynamics.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n, 89.65.-s 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
Darwinian evolution incorporates three basic processes:
mutation, selection and random drift. In evolving popula-
tions mutations create variation, which produce fitness differ-
ences for selection to act upon and random drift accounts for
stochastic effects arising due to the finite size of the popula-
tion. The consideration of finite populations has a long tradi-
tion in population genetics [1, 2, 3, 4] with frequency inde-
pendent selection. Often, finite size effects can be viewed as
corrections to a continuum theory based on an infinite popula-
tion [5, 6]. Here, we analyze such finite population effects for
frequency dependent selection. Under frequency dependent
selection, or co-evolutionary dynamics, the fitness of each
individual is affected by interactions with other members of
the population. The corresponding mathematical framework
is evolutionary game theory [7, 8]. In the absence of muta-
tions and in the deterministic limit of large well-mixed pop-
ulations where individuals interact randomly, the replicator
equation [9, 10] describes the change in frequency of the dif-
ferent strategic types in the population. Including mutations
in this limit leads to the replicator-mutator equation [11, 12].
Interestingly, results can be quite different when turning to
coevolutionary processes in finite populations based on the
Moran process [3, 13, 14]. The frequency dependent Moran
process is a stochastic birth-death process where an individ-
ual is randomly selected for reproduction with a probability
proportional to its fitness. The clonal offspring then replaces
a randomly chosen individual in the population such that the
population size remains constant. If there are only two types
of individuals in the population, the evolutionary process can
be mapped onto a random walk in one dimension [15]. For
more than two types the dynamics becomes significantly more
difficult [16]. Further complications arise when individuals no
longer interact randomly but, instead, spatial structure leads to
limited local interactions. Traditionally, this is modeled by ar-
ranging individuals on a spatial lattice [17, 18, 19] or on more
general networks [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25] and leads to new
phenomena, which includes critical phase transitions [26], and
can affect the evolutionary process even in frequency indepen-
dent settings [27, 28].
For two strategic types in well-mixed populations we estab-
lished an explicit connection between microscopic stochastic
processes in finite populations and the deterministic limit of
infinite populations [29]. The finite size effects are captured
in the drift and diffusion terms of a Fokker-Planck equation
where the diffusion term vanishes with 1/N for increasing
population sizes. In the present paper the Fokker-Planck equa-
tion is generalized to an arbitrary number of strategies as well
as to cover mutational changes of the strategic type.
In Sec. II, the frequency dependent Moran process is gen-
eralized to d strategies including mutations. The derivation of
the corresponding Fokker-Planck equation is recalled in Sec.
III and the stationary distribution is derived in Sec. IV. This
covers frequency independent and frequency dependent selec-
tion. As applications, we consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
the Snowdrift game. The relation to dynamics in infinite pop-
ulations is derived in Sec. V. An example for an alternative
microscopic process is provided in Sec. VI.
II. GENERALIZED MORAN PROCESS
The frequency dependent Moran process has been intro-
duced as a stochastic process among two types [13]. Although
the extension to more strategies is straightforward [16], the
2dynamics becomes significantly more difficult. In complete
analogy to the Moran process among two individuals, an in-
dividual is chosen at random proportional to fitness in every
time step. This individual produces offspring which replaces
a randomly chosen individual. In addition to the original fre-
quency dependent Moran process, we include mutations, i.e.
an individual of type k produces offspring of type j with prob-
abiliy qjk , where
∑d
j=1 qjk = 1 and d is the number of differ-
ent types in the population. The special case of vanishing mu-
tations is recovered by setting qjk = δjk . Note that there are
no restrictions on the frequency of mutations or on the states in
which mutations occur. For d > 2, the state space of the sys-
tem is not longer a simple one-dimensional chain, but the dis-
cretized simplex SNd = {(i1, . . . , id) ∈ Nd0 :
∑d
j=1 ij = N},
where ij is the number of individuals of type j and N is the
total size of the population. The fitness pij of an individual
of type j is a linear combination of the payoff from interac-
tions given by the entries of the d × d payoff matrix M with
elements mjk and a baseline fitness, which is set to one for
convenience. Hence,
pij(i1, . . . , id) = 1− w + w
∑d
k=1mjkik −mjj
N − 1 , (1)
where self interactions are excluded by subtracting the payoff
mjj . The selection intensity w determines the relative con-
tributions of the baseline fitness and the interactions to the
total fitness of an individual. For w → 0 selection is weak
and payoffs from the game represent small perturbations to
the constant background fitness. For strong selection, w → 1,
the influence of the background fitness vanishes and fitness is
determined entirely by interactions. Since individuals are se-
lected proportional to fitness, the fitness has to be a positive
number. This can be guaranteed by payoff matrices with pos-
itive entries only, mjk ≥ 0 for all j and k, or by a sufficiently
small w.
Based on this fitness definition, the probability Tkj that an
individual of type k is replaced by an individual of type j can
be calculated. Tkj is the product of the probability that the
individual chosen at random for elimination is of type k and
the probability that an offspring of type j is produced. There
are two possibilities to produce such an offspring: An indi-
vidual of type j is chosen for reproduction with probability
ijpij/(Nφ), where φ =
∑d
m=1 pimim/N , is the average pay-
off in the population. It produces identical offspring (with
probability qjj ). The second possibility is that an individual
of type l produces an offspring of type j due to mutations
(with probability qlj ). Hence, the probability Tkj is given by
Tkj(i1, ..., id) =
1
Nφ
d∑
l=1
ilpil(i1, . . . , id) qlj
ik
N
. (2)
These transition probabilities describe the effect of selection
and mutation in finite populations. The probabilistic nature of
this coevolutionary process accounts for random drift.
Since the state space of this system is no longer a one-
dimensional chain for d > 2, many standard methods can no
longer be applied. However, as in the case d = 2 a Fokker-
Planck equation for the dynamics of the system can be derived
for large populations.
Although we are motivated by the generalized frequency
dependent Moran process, the calculations following in Secs.
III and IV are valid in a more general sense. In particular,
they apply to any coevolutionary birth death process, such as
the local update rule discussed in [29], see Sec. VI.
III. FOKKER-PLANCK EQUATION
In analogy to Ref. [29] for d = 2, a general Fokker-Planck
equation for the probability density of strategies ρ(x) in an
evolutionary game among d types can be derived. The con-
stant population size of the generalized Moran process leads
to a normalization of x,
∑d
j=1 xj = 1. Thus, we have d − 1
independent variables. As shown in the Appendix, a Kramers-
Moyal expansion yields the Fokker-Planck equation:
ρ˙(x) = −
d−1∑
k=1
∂
∂xk
ρ(x)ak(x)+
1
2
d−1∑
j,k=1
∂2
∂xk∂xj
ρ(x)bjk(x),
(3)
where x = (x1, . . . , xd) with xj = ij/N . The drift coeffi-
cients are given by
ak(x) =
d∑
j=1
Tjk(x)− Tkj(x) (4)
and can be interpreted as an effective flow into state k: The
first term is the probability that the number of k individuals
increases, whereas the second term describes the probability
for transitions from k to other states. For the diffusion matrix,
we find
bjk(x)=
1
N
[
−Tjk(x)− Tkj(x) + δjk
d∑
l=1
Tjl(x) + Tlj(x)
]
.
(5)
For two types, d = 2, and without mutations, the Fokker-
Planck equation from [29] is recovered. Eq. (3) describes
the dynamics on the basis of changes in the probability dis-
tribution. Traditionally, coevolutionary systems are often de-
scribed by considering dynamical equations for the state of
the system. General conclusions are then based on averages
made over several realizations of the process. Here, the corre-
spondence between both descriptions becomes clear, since the
Fokker-Planck equation (3) corresponds to a stochastic dif-
ferential equation [30, 31, 32]. The noise arises only from
stochastic updating and is therefore not correlated in time.
Hence, the Itoˆ calculus can be applied to derive a Langevin
equation describing the development of x. Equation (3) cor-
responds to the stochastic replicator-mutator equation
x˙k = ak(x) +
d−1∑
j=1
ckj(x)ξj(t) (6)
where ckj is defined by
∑d−1
l=1 ckl(x)clj(x) = bkj(x). Each
element of the vector ξ is Gaussian white noise with unit vari-
ance. The different elements are uncorrelated, 〈ξk(t)ξj(s)〉 =
3δkjδ(t − s). Equation (6) allows to approximate fluctuations
arising from finite populations by Langevin terms that appear
in a replicator equation. For any given payoff matrix, selec-
tion pressure, population size and mutation rate, it provides
a quantitative description of the fluctuations introduced by
stochastic microscopic update processes.
IV. STATIONARY DISTRIBUTION
The stationary distribution of strategies ρ∗(x) can be de-
rived from the Fokker-Planck equation (3), which can be writ-
ten in the form
ρ˙(x) = −∇J(x), (7)
where the d− 1 elements of the probability current J(x) are
Jk(x) = ρ(x)ak(x)− 1
2
d−1∑
j=1
∂
∂xj
ρ(x)bjk(x). (8)
In general, the stationary solution ρ˙(x) = 0 is equivalent to a
probability current without sources. A special case of this is a
probability current vanishing everywhere, i.e. Jk(x) = 0 for
all x. This leads to
d−1∑
k=1
bjk(x)
∂
∂xk
ρ∗(x) = ρ∗(x)
[
2aj(x)−
d−1∑
k=1
∂
∂xk
bjk(x)
]
.
(9)
If we exclude the degenerate cases with det bjk(x) = 0, the
matrix bjk(x) can be inverted and Eq. (9) reduces to
∂
∂xi
ln ρ∗(x)=
d−1∑
j=1
b−1ij (x)
[
2aj(x)−
d−1∑
k=1
∂
∂xk
bjk(x)
]
=Γi(x)
(10)
A solution of this equation only exists if Γ(x) is a gradient
[30, 32]. In that case, the stationary solution of Eq. (3) can
be obtained from a line integral between x0 and x (which is
independent of the path)
ρ∗(x) = N exp
[∫
x
x0
Γ (y) · dy
]
, (11)
where N is a normalization constant. However, in co-
evolutionary systems the requirement that Γ(x) is a gradient
is often not fulfilled. In that case, a stationary solution may
still exist in which the ansatz of a vanishing probability cur-
rent, J(x) = 0, is not valid although the divergence of J(x)
remains zero, ∇J(x) = 0. In these cases the stationary dis-
tribution has to be derived by different means.
A particularly simple case where these problems do not
arise is d = 2, where only two types A and B are present.
The state of the system can be described by the fraction x of
A individuals. The remaining fraction 1− x consists of B in-
dividuals. Assuming a mutation rate u from A to B as well as
from B to A, the transition probabilities read
TBA(x) =
xpiA(x)(1 − u) + (1 − x)piB(x)u
φ
(1 − x),
TAB(x) =
xpiA(x)u + (1− x)piB(x)(1 − u)
φ
x. (12)
The drift and diffusion terms in the Fokker-Planck equation
become
a(x) = x(1 − x)piA(x)− piB(x)
φ
(13)
+u
(1− x)piB(x)− xpiA(x)
φ
b(x) =
1
N
x(1 − x)piA(x) + piB(x)
φ
(14)
+
u
N
xpiA(x) + (x− 1)piB(x)
φ
(2x− 1).
The stationary solution of Eq. (3) can now be computed as
outlined above and is given by
ρ∗(x) = N exp
[∫ x
0
Γ(y)dy
]
, (15)
where Γ(y) = b−1(y)(2a(y) − b′(y)), b′(y) = d
dy
b(y) and
N = ∫ 1
0
exp
[∫ x
0
Γ(y)dy
]
dx. In general, the derivation of
a stationary distribution of strategies under the effect of mu-
tations cannot be solved analytically. Earlier approaches have
approximated such distributions either by assuming weak mu-
tations [33], where only transition probabilities between ab-
sorbing states have to be considered, or by neglecting all mu-
tations except those in the absorbing states [34]. The distribu-
tion given by Eq. (15) for large N is valid for arbitrary selec-
tion intensity w, mutation rate u, and any payoff matrix.
A. Neutral dynamics
In the frequency dependent Moran process, often weak se-
lection, w ≪ 1, is considered [13, 25]. For weak selection,
the interactions are only corrections to a background of neu-
tral dynamics [4, 35]. Therefore, we first discuss the station-
ary distribution for w = 0, where the game has no influ-
ence on the fitness. In this case, Γ(x) is a gradient, which
is equivalent to the assumption that the probability current
vanishes everywhere, and the stationary distribution can be
computed directly from Eq. (11). For d = 2, we find for
the drift term a(x) = u(1 − 2x) and for the diffusion term
b(x) = (u(2x− 1)2 + 2x(1− x))/N . Both results are valid
for the case in which the mutation rates from A to B and vice
versa are u. Hence, Γ(x) is given by
Γ(x) = −2(u(2 +N)− 1)(2x− 1)
u(2x− 1)2 + 2x(1− x) . (16)
Γ(x) vanishes for the critical mutation rate uc = 1/(2 +N).
For u < uc, Γ(x) has a minimum at x = 1/2. Accord-
ingly, the stationary probability distribution has maxima at
the boundaries when only few mutations per generation oc-
cur. On the other hand, for u > uc there is a maximum at
x = 1/2. Mutations lead the system away from the states
x = 0 and x = 1 and the distribution is centered around the
middle where both strategies have equal frequencies, see Fig.
1. For u = uc we have Γ(x) = 0 and hence Eq. (15) predicts
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FIG. 1: For neutral selection, w = 0, three different scenarios occur
for the stationary distribution of the system: For u < uc = 1/(2 +
N), the system spends most of the time near the absorbing states,
leading to maxima of the stationary distribution at i = 0 and i = N ,
as shown for u = 0.005. For u = uc ≈ 0.01, the probability to
leave the absorbing states due to mutations and the probability to
reach them by random drift are approximately equal, leading to a
uniform distribution. For u > uc, there is on average more than one
mutation per generation and the stationary distribution is centered
around i = N/2. In all three cases, numerical simulations of the
stationary distribution depicted by symbols agree very well with the
theoretical result Eq. (15) shown as lines (simulations are averages
over 108 time steps, N = 100).
a uniform distribution. However, simulations show a distri-
bution that decays slightly toward the boundaries for small N
(cf. Fig. 1). Strictly speaking, a uniform distribution is ob-
served only in the limit N →∞.
Critical mutation rates can also be computed for general d
in the case of symmetric mutations in which the mutation rate
between two different states is u, i.e. qlj = u+δlj(1−du). All
elements of Γ(x) vanish for u = uc = 1/(d + N), because
2aj(x) =
∑d−1
k=1
∂
∂xk
bjk(x). Hence, a uniform distribution
is expected for u = uc in the limit of N → ∞. For smaller
mutation rate u < uc, the distribution has maxima at the cor-
ners of the simplex where only one strategy is present. For
larger u > uc, the distribution has one maximum in the inte-
rior of the simplex. Fig. 2 illustrates these two different cases
for neutral selection with three different types, d = 3.
B. Frequency dependent selection
For w > 0, interactions lead to frequency dependent tran-
sition probabilities and to corrections of the stationary distri-
bution. Depending on the nature of the game and the strength
of selection, significant differences from neutral evolution are
possible.
As examples, we consider two generic cases of 2×2 games,
the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Snowdrift game. In the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma [36, 37], two players choose simultaneously
whether to cooperate or to defect. The cost of cooperation is
c, while the benefit from cooperation is b. The interaction of
x y x y
z z
u=0.05 u=0.005
(a) (b)
u= .005
z z
x y
(b))
.05
FIG. 2: (Color online) For d = 3 strategies and neutral selection
(w = 0), the stationary distribution in the strategy space spanned
by the simplex S3 is shown encoded by a color scale, where bright
colors indicate high values. (a) For mutation rates higher than the
critical mutation rate uc = 1/(3 + N), mutations drive the system
away from the absorbing states at the corners of the simplex. Due to
the symmetry of the system, the stationary distribution has a maxi-
mum centered in the middle of the simplex where x = y = z. (b)
If the mutation rates are smaller than than the critical mutation rate
uc, the system spends considerable time in the absorbing states at
the corners. Occasionally, the edges are reached by mutations. How-
ever, since the system typically reaches the corners again before the
next mutation occurs, the stationary probability density in the inte-
rior is very small. In both cases, the simulations of the stationary
probability distribution shown here (averages over 108 time steps)
do not deviate significantly from the analytical result Eq. (11): for
u = 0.05 the maximal deviation is ≈ 2% and for u = 0.005 it is
≈ 6% (population size N = 60).
a cooperator with a defector leads to a payoff of −c for the
cooperator and b for the defector. When two cooperators in-
teract, they both get the payoff b − c, whereas the interaction
of two defectors leads to a payoff of 0. Thus, irrespective of
the other player’s move, it is always better to defect. How-
ever, the reward for mutual cooperation would be the mutu-
ally preferred outcome and hence the dilemma. The game is
described by the payoff matrix
M =
(
m11 m12
m21 m22
)
=
(
b − c −c
b 0
)
, (17)
The fitness is now a linear combination of the background
fitness and the average payoff from interactions. For coopera-
tors, the fitness becomespiC = 1−w+w((b−c)(i−1)−c (N−
i))/N , whereas defectors have fitness piD = 1−w+w b i/N .
Since the fitness of defectors is always higher than the fitness
of cooperators, piD > piC , any individual is better off not co-
operating, despite the fact that mutual cooperation leads to
a higher average payoff. Without mutations the majority of
stochastic trajectories would therefore end up in the absorb-
ing state with 100% defectors and only few trajectories end
up in pure cooperation. For u < uc = 1/(N +2), the station-
ary distribution keeps a maximum at x = 0, but also a second
(smaller) maximum at the other absorbing state x = 1, see
Fig. 3. For u > uc, mutations drive the system away from
these states and a maximum appears for intermediate values
of x. The position of this maximum is determined by the in-
tensity of selectionw and the payoff matrix. For increasingN ,
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FIG. 3: Stationary distribution of strategies in a Prisoner’s Dilemma
under the influence of mutations and selection in a finite population.
The distribution undergoes a qualitative change with increasing pop-
ulation size. Main figure: For N = 50, the stationary distribution
for w = 0.2 has a maximum at the Nash equilibrium x = 0, where
only defectors are present, as u is below the critical mutation rate
uc = 0.02. When selection is weak, it resembles the result from
neutral selection (w = 0.01). Inset: When the population size is in-
creased to N = 10000, the mutation rate is above the critical value
uc ≈ 10−4 and the situation resembles the result expected from the
deterministic description of the replicator-mutator equation: The sta-
tionary distribution has a maximum at x∗ ≈ 0.14 for w = 0.2,
which is the stable fixed point of the replicator-mutator equation.
For weak selection, w = 0.01, the stable fixed point is located at
x∗ ≈ 0.47 and the distribution around this fixed point is wider due
to stronger fluctuations. In all cases, numerical simulations of the
frequency dependent Moran process (symbols) agree well with the
analytical solution Eq. (15) for the stationary distribution depicted
by lines (b = 1, c = 0.25, mutation rate u = 0.01, average over 108
time steps).
the situation may change from u < uc to u > uc. Therefore,
the stochastic effects arising from the finite population size
are clearly visible for small N , whereas large N resembles a
stationary distribution that is similar to the one expected from
the deterministic replicator-mutator equation, see Sec. V.
As a second example, we consider the Snowdrift game [38]
also known as ”Hawk-Dove game” or ”Chicken”. In this
game, two players again choose between cooperation and de-
fection. While the payoffs for defectors are as in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, cooperation becomes more favorable: The payoff
of a cooperator against a defector is now b − c and therefore
higher than the payoff of a defector against a defector. On the
other hand, it is still lower than the payoff for mutual cooper-
ation, b− c/2. The payoff matrix is given by
M =
(
m11 m12
m21 m22
)
=
(
b− c
2
b− c
b 0
)
. (18)
Again, the payoff is a linear combination of the background
fitness and the average payoff from interactions. In the Snow-
drift game, rare strategies are always favored, resulting in a
drift away from the absorbing states x = 0 and x = 1. In-
stead, the distribution is centered around a stable equilibrium
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FIG. 4: The Snowdrift game exhibits a stable interior equilibrium
and typically coexistence of the two different types is observed. Only
for small mutation rates and weak selection, the absorbing states are
reached. Therefore, the stationary distribution has a maximum in the
interior. For weak selection (w = 0.01) this maximum is close to
x = 0.5. With stronger selection, the maximum moves toward the
mixed equilibrium at x∗ ≈ 0.856. Numerical simulations (symbols)
are in good agreement with the theoretical result depicted by full
lines (b = 1, c = 0.25, mutation rate u = 0.01, averages over 108
time steps, N = 200).
in the interior. With decreasing intensity of selection, the dis-
tribution around this equilibrium becomes wider. In the limit
N → ∞ and without mutations (u = 0), the distribution nar-
rows and converges to x∗ = 2(b − c)/(2b − c), the only sta-
ble fixed point of the replicator dynamics. Finite size fluc-
tuations lead to a distribution around this deterministic fixed
point while mutations move the maximum of this distribution
toward x = 0.5. As for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, simulations
of the stationary distribution agree well with the analytical re-
sult Eq. (15), cf. Fig. 4.
V. REPLICATOR-MUTATOR EQUATION
In the limit of infinite population size, our framework es-
tablishes a natural connection to the traditional determinis-
tic description of coevolutionary dynamics. The determin-
istic nature of this limit arises from the fact that the diffu-
sion matrix bkj(x) and thus the finite size fluctuations vanish
with 1/
√
N as N → ∞. Hence, the Langevin equation be-
comes deterministic and the dynamics is given by the drift
term, x˙k =
∑d
k=1 (Tjk − Tkj). Since the mutation rate per
individual is fixed, the effect of mutations prevails in the limit
of N → ∞. In this case, Eq. (6) incorporating mutation and
selection can be written as
x˙k =
1
φ
d∑
j=1
xjpij(x)qjk − xk. (19)
This is the replicator-mutator equation corresponding to the
adjusted replicator dynamics [7]. So far, replicator-mutator
6equations [11, 12] have not been derived from a microscopic
birth-death process. They are the natural extension of the de-
terministic replicator equation [9, 10] that take into account
mutations between strategies. Without mutations, qjk = δjk ,
types that have a fitness above the average fitness in the pop-
ulation increase in abundance, while types with a fitness be-
low average decrease in abundance. Mutations interfere with
this selection dynamics: Only types that have a fitness above
the average and that have a sufficiently small mutation rate
increase in frequency. Hence, the stable fixed points of the
system represent a balance between selection dynamics and
mutation dynamics.
VI. LOCAL UPDATE PROCESS
So far, we have only considered the frequency dependent
Moran process. However, our framework can also be applied
to other coevolutionary processes. As an example, we gener-
alize the local update process [29] to an arbitrary number of
strategies. In the local update process, an individual 1 is cho-
sen at random and compares its payoff to another randomly
chosen individual 2. With probability
p =
1
2
+
w
2
pi2 − pi1
∆pi
(20)
1 adapts the strategy of 2 (where the constant ∆pi is the max-
imal possible payoff difference and w denotes the intensity of
selection) [39]. For d different types, the transition probabili-
ties are given by
Tkj(x) = xkxj
(
1
2
+
w
2
pij(x)− pik(x)
∆pi
)
. (21)
From the transition probabilities, we can calculate the drift
term ak(x) = (w/∆pi) xk (pik(x)− φ), which is indepen-
dent of N . The diffusion term is independent of the payoffs
and simplifies to bjk(x) = xj (δjk − xk) /N . Thus, up to a
constant rescaling of time, we recover the standard replicator
dynamics for d types in the limit N →∞,
x˙k = xk (pik(x)− φ) . (22)
Up to a dynamical rescaling of time, Eq. (22) is identical to
Eq. (19) without mutations. The natural extension of Eq. (22)
that includes mutations (while retaining the time scale) is the
standard replicator-mutator equation [12],
x˙k =
d∑
j=1
xjpij(x)qjk−xkφ =
d∑
j,l=1
xjpij(x)(xlqjk−xkqkl).
(23)
For general qjk, it is not possible to define a microscopic pro-
cess in which the transition probabilities only depend on pay-
off differences that leads to this differential equation. Only
for the special case of vanishing mutations qjk = δjk, this is
possible.
A microscopic mechanism involving spontaneous muta-
tions has been proposed in [40]. This yields the transition
rates [41]
Tkj(x) = xkxj
(
1
2
+
w
2
pij(x)− pik(x)
∆pi
)
+ xkqkj . (24)
As shown in [40], the limit N →∞ results in the differential
equation
x˙k =
w
∆pi
xk (pik(x)− φ) +
d∑
j=1
(xjqjk − xkqkj) . (25)
This selection mutation equation reduces to the standard repli-
cator dynamics for qjk = δjk [10, 42]. It describes selection
under the influence of spontanteous mutations. Such sponta-
neous mutations can also be incorporated into other coevolu-
tionary processes, leading to the same additive mutation term∑d
j=1 (xjqjk − xkqkj).
VII. DISCUSSION
Traditional descriptions of co-evolutionary systems rely on
the assumption that populations are sufficiently large such that
they can safely be considered infinite. In this case, accidental
fixation of types with low fitness is not possible. For the more
realistic case of finite populations, only few analytical meth-
ods exist that are often restricted to two types. Hence, these
systems often rely on simulations which are very illuminative
for special cases, but give little insight into the general dynam-
ics of these systems. Here, we have shown how to extend the
replicator dynamics in order to account for fluctuations arising
from finite population sizes for any number of strategies and
arbitrary mutation rates. When allowing for mutations, homo-
geneous states in which only one type is present are no longer
absorbing boundaries and, instead, the system converges to a
stationary distribution. This stationary distribution is derived
using standard methods from statistical physics and depends
on the population size, the mutation rate and the interaction
parameters, i.e., the game. The fluctuation term allows for the
calculation of corrections to the replicator dynamics for finite
populations and is an important step in comparing individ-
ual based coevolutionary systems with deterministic dynam-
ics. Mutations are not a source of fluctuations, but provide a
mechanism that leads to a mixing of different types. However,
fluctuations do not arise solely from finite populations. In-
stead, there are additional sources of noise that might have to
be incorporated in other ways, such as noise from heterogene-
ity of agents or external noise that can influence interactions.
Our approach can be applied to any number of strategies d,
but is based on the assumption that the population size is suf-
ficiently large such that population densities can be approxi-
mated by smooth functions. In high dimensional spaces, such
a continuum description may not always be appropriate [43].
Starting from microscopic descriptions for individual based
coevolutionary processes with an arbitrary number of strate-
gies, we have derived a replicator mutator equation with ad-
ditional first order corrections that describe stochastic effects
arising from finite populations.
7APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF THE FOKKER-PLANCK
EQUATION FOR AN ARBITRARY NUMBER OF
STRATEGIC TYPES
For d strategies, the Master equation describing the change
of the probability P τ (i1, .., id) that the system is in focal state
(i1, .., id) is given by
P τ+∆τ(i1, .., id) = P
τ (i1, ..., id) (A1)
+∆τ
d∑
j,k=1
P τ (i1, ..., ij−1, ..., ik+1, ..., id)
× Tkj(i1, ..., ij−1, ..., ik+1, ..., id)
−∆τ
d∑
j,k=1
P τ (i1, ..., id)Tkj(i1, ..., id).
The first term is the probability that during a short time inter-
val ∆τ the state remains unchanged, the second term is the
influx from other states and the third term is the outflux to
other states. The probability Tkj(i1, ..., id) that one individ-
ual of type k is replaced by another individual of type j does
not have to be specified. Special cases are given by Eqs. (2)
and (24). Next, we introduce the notation xl = il/N and
t = τ/N and the probability density ρ(x; t) = NP t(x). For
simplicity, we use the abbreviation (j−, k+) = (x1, ...xj −
1/N, ..., xk+1/N, ...xd) for states neighboring the focal state
x = (i1, . . . , id)/N and obtain
ρ(x; t+∆t)− ρ(x; t)
N∆t
=
d∑
j,k=1
ρ(j−, k+; t)Tkj(j
−, k+)
−
d∑
j,k=1
ρ(x; t)Tkj(x), (A2)
For N ≫ 1, the left hand side can be approximated by
ρ˙(x; t)/N . In order to expand the right hand side of Eq. (A2)
for N ≫ 1, we rewrite the first term as
d∑
j,k=1
ρ(j−, k+; t)Tkj(j
−, k+) =
d∑
j,k=1
ρ(j−, k+; t)Tkj(j
−, k+) + ρ(j+, k−; t)Tjk(j
+, k−)
2
. (A3)
The expansion of the probability density at a state (j±, k∓) at time t can be written as
ρ(j±, k∓; t) ≈ ρ(x; t)± 1
N
[
∂ρ(x; t)
∂xj
− ∂ρ(x; t)
∂xk
]
+
1
2N2
[
∂2ρ(x; t)
∂x2j
− 2∂
2ρ(x; t)
∂xj∂xk
+
∂2ρ(x; t)
∂x2k
]
(A4)
and similarly for the transition probabilities
Tkj(j
±, k∓) ≈ Tkj(x)± 1
N
[
∂Tkj(x)
∂xj
− ∂Tkj(x)
∂xk
]
+
1
2N2
[
∂2Tkj(x)
∂x2j
− 2∂
2Tkj(x)
∂xj∂xk
+
∂2Tkj(x)
∂x2k
]
. (A5)
Let us consider the terms on the right hand side of Eq. (A2) depending on their order in 1/N . Obviously, the terms that are
independent of N cancel. Up to 1/N , we find
1
2N
d∑
j,k=1
[
ρ(x; t)
(
∂Tkj(x)
∂xk
− ∂Tkj(x)
∂xj
)
+ ρ(x; t)
(
∂Tjk(x)
∂xj
− ∂Tjk(x)
∂xk
)
+ Tkj(x)
(
∂ρ(x; t)
∂xk
− ∂ρ(x; t)
∂xj
)
+Tjk(x)
(
∂ρ(x; t)
∂xj
− ∂ρ(x; t)
∂xk
)]
= − 1
N
d∑
k=1
∂
∂xk
d∑
j=1
ρ(x; t) [Tjk(x)− Tkj(x)] (A6)
Since 1/N appearing on both sides of Eq. (A2) cancels, this determines the drift term that is independent of N . All other terms
vanish for N →∞. The first correction for finite population sizes is the diffusion term resulting from terms in the expansion of
the right hand side of Eq. (A2) that are of order 1/N2. For these terms, we find
1
2N2
d∑
j,k=1
[
Tkj(x) + Tjk(x)
2
(
∂2
∂x2j
− 2 ∂
2
∂xj∂xk
+
∂2
∂x2k
)
ρ(x; t) + ρ(x; t)
(
∂2
∂x2j
− 2 ∂
2
∂xj∂xk
+
∂2
∂x2k
)
Tkj(x) + Tjk(x)
2
+
∂ρ(x; t)
∂xk
∂Tkj(x)
∂xk
− ∂ρ(x; t)
∂xk
∂Tkj(x)
∂xj
− ∂ρ(x; t)
∂xj
∂Tkj(x)
∂xk
+
∂ρ(x; t)
∂xj
∂Tkj(x)
∂xj
+
∂ρ(x; t)
∂xk
∂Tjk(x)
∂xk
− ∂ρ(x; t)
∂xk
∂Tjk(x)
∂xj
−∂ρ(x; t)
∂xj
∂Tjk(x)
∂xk
+
∂ρ(x; t)
∂xj
∂Tjk(x)
∂xj
]
=
1
2N2
d∑
k,j=1
[(
∂2
∂x2k
− ∂
2
∂xj∂xk
)
ρ(x; t) (Tkj(x) + Tjk(x))
]
. (A7)
8So far, we have not used the normalization condition,∑d
j=1 xj = 1. Since xd is fully determined by xj with
1 ≤ j < d, we eliminate the dependence on xd in the transi-
tion probabilities Tjk and in the probability density ρ. Hence,
all derivatives with respect to xd vanish. Applying this and
combining (A6) and (A7) with the expansion of the left hand
side of Eq. (A2), we obtain the Fokker-Planck equation
ρ˙(x) = −
d−1∑
k=1
∂
∂xk
ρ(x)ak(x) +
1
2
d−1∑
j,k=1
∂2
∂xk∂xj
ρ(x)bjk(x)
(A8)
with drift vector
ak(x) =
d∑
j=1
(Tjk(x)− Tkj(x)) (A9)
and a diffusion matrix bjl defined as
bjk(x)=
1
N
[
−Tjk(x)− Tkj(x) + δjk
d∑
l=1
Tjl(x) + Tlj(x)
]
,
(A10)
which is symmetric, bjk(x) = bkj(x). Note that the drift
vector of a system with d strategies has d − 1 components,
k = 1, . . . , d− 1 and that the diffusion matrix is of dimension
d− 1.
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